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CHOICE OF LAW IN WASHINGTON-
THE EVOLUTION CONTINUES
Philip A. Trautman*
Twenty years ago an analysis of choice of law principles in the state
of Washington concluded with the following observation: "The evolu-
tionary process has finally begun in Washington. It will be a long time
in developing. The limitations on that development are only those
imposed by the ingenuity, insights and degree of in-depth research and
work of counsel and the court."'
Much has happened in the twenty years since that statement was
made. On the national level, the United States Supreme Court has for
the most part withdrawn from the scene and has imposed little control
upon the states in the sense of constitutional limitations.2 Indeed, the
states are now almost totally free to devise their own choice of law
doctrines.3 The result is much diversity between states with each inde-
pendently developing its own choice of law principles.4
Washington now has its own unique methodology.5 This article will
discuss the developments of the past twenty years. The discussion will
include an analysis of what the Washington courts have said and actu-
ally done and an evaluation of problems still to be resolved.
I. THE BEGINNINGS
The present Washington approach to conflict of laws had its origin
in two cases decided the same day in 1967. In Baffin Land Corp. v.
Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 6 an action was brought to collect delin-
quent payments under a television rental agreement between a Dela-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A. 1952, J.D. 1954, University of
Washington. Preparation of this article was supported in part by a research grant to the author
from the University of Washington School of Law.
1. Trautman, Evolution in Washington Choice of Law-A Beginning, 43 WASH. L. REV. 309,
335 (1967).
2. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
3. Constitutional limitations on choice of law may on very rare occasions be breached. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
4. A comparison of the approaches in the various states may be found in Kay, Theory into
Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521 (1983). A more limited regional
comparison (Washington, Oregon, and Alaska) is set forth in J. NAFZIGER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
A NORTHWEST PERSPECTIVE (1985).
5. The United States Supreme Court has stated that each of the fifty states "applies its own set
of malleable choice-of-law rules." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981).
6. 70 Wash. 2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967).
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ware corporation, authorized to do business in Washington, and Mr.
Clark, who, on behalf of the marital community of himself and his
wife, was operating a motor inn in Washington. The agreement was
signed in Washington by Mr. Clark and a salesman of the corporation
and forwarded to New York where it was signed by a vice president.
Under the provisions of the agreement, a binding contract was not
formed until the signature was affixed in New York. Subsequently, the
Clarks were divorced. The trial court entered a judgment against the
motor inn and Mr. Clark but denied recovery against the wife. The
court held that the obligations of the contract were governed by the
rule of lex loci contractus, and because the last act necessary to form a
binding contract occurred in New York, New York law governed.
The trial court further found that under New York law neither the
wife nor the community was liable.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed. The court stated it
would no longer adhere to the rule of lex loci contractus and the
"largely discredited" theory of vested rights. Rather, the court
adopted the "better rule" that the law of the state with which a con-
tract has the most significant relationship will govern the validity and
effect of the contract.7 Advantages seen in the new approach were
more flexibility, less arbitrariness, and greater emphasis to the desires
and expectations of the parties. Recognition was given to the drafters
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict ofLaws as providing the "basic
stepping stone" to a better contracts choice of law doctrine.8
The court stressed that the new approach was not to count contacts,
but rather to consider which contacts were most significant. Never-
theless, the court went on to list the contacts with Washington and
New York and to conclude that Washington was the state with the
most significant relationship to the contract. Although the court dis-
cussed the importance of various contacts, such as the place of rendi-
tion of services under the contract, it is not entirely clear why the
Washington contacts were more significant than the New York
contacts.
It is clear that the content of the law of the two states and the poli-
cies behind, and purposes of, such laws were not controlling nor even
of any consequence. For it was only after the court had concluded
that Washington was the most significant state that the court turned to
7. The court stated that the "most significant relationship" theory, the "'center of gravity"
theory, and the "most significant contacts" approach are "roughly synonymous." Baffin. 70
Wash. 2d at 896 n.]. 425 P.2d at 625 n.L.
8. Id. at 900, 425 P.2d at 627.
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"the question of what the applicable Washington law is."9 The court
held that under Washington law the agreement signed by the husband
created a community obligation and that the plaintiff was entitled to
satisfy its judgment out of any property held by either spouse which
was formerly the couple's community property. Nothing was said
about the content of the New York law."°
On the same day as Baffin, the court decided Pacific States Cut
Stone Co. v. Goble. " Quarry machinery located in Oregon was sold by
plaintiff, a Washington corporation, to Goble and Wallace, who, along
with their wives, were Washington residents. The conditional sales
contract was signed in Oregon, after which the machinery was
removed to Washington. The purchasers defaulted in their payments,
and an action was instituted against them, their wives, and the respec-
tive marital communities. The trial court applied the rule of lex loci
contractus and held that because the contract was made in Oregon,
that law governed. The trial court further held that under Oregon law
neither the defendant wives nor the defendant communities were lia-
ble; judgment was entered only against Goble and Wallace. The
Washington Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the
communities.
Relying upon Baffin, the court applied the most significant relation-
ship approach. Although all the parties were from Washington, the
court concluded that the most significant contacts, such as place of
execution, negotiation, and performance, and situs of the subject mat-
ter of the contract, were in Oregon. As in Baffin, the decision was
reached with" only a listing of the contacts and without consideration
of the laws of the two states.
The actual basis for the final judgment, however, was that the case
did "not present a true conflict choice of law problem."' 12 This was so
because, in the court's view, the result was the same under both Ore-
gon and Washington law, namely, that the defendant communities
were liable.' 3
9. Id. at 903, 425 P.2d at 629.
10. It has been suggested that an examination of the laws of the two states would have
concluded that both states' internal law imposed liability on the wife. See J. Nafziger, supra note
4, at 162 (1985).
11. 70 Wash. 2d 907, 425 P.2d 631 (1967).
12. Id. at 909, 425 P.2d at 632.
13. This part of the Goble reasoning was later criticized by the Washington Supreme Court.
In a footnote in Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Lapp, 95 Wash. 2d 341, 345 n.1, 622 P.2d 850,
854 n.1 (1980), the court said:
In fact, Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v. Goble. 70 Wn.2d 907, 425 P.2d 631 (1967), was in
error in finding a false conflict. The case involved a debt incurred in Oregon by two
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The two cases laid the foundation for the creation of new conflict of
laws doctrine. For contract questions, the orthodoxy of place of mak-
ing or place of performance was no longer to be applied. To the extent
that the laws of two states were the same, or, even if different, would
produce the same result, and thus there was a "false" conflict, the case
would be decided to reach that result. To the extent that there was a
"true" conflict, the analysis would be in the context of determining
which state was the one of most significant relationship.
II. BEYOND CONTACTS
Like Baffin and Goble, the third modern choice-of-law case in
Washington arose in a contract-community property setting. The
analysis, however, was much different than in the first two cases. In
Potlatch No. 1 Federal Credit Union v. Kennedy, "4 an Idaho creditor
sought recovery on a note against several defendants including a
Washington resident who had cosigned the note without his wife's
knowledge. Recovery was also sought against the community
although it had received no benefit from the husband's assumption of
the comaker's obligation.
Under Washington law, community property was liable for the
suretyship debt of one of the parties only if the community had been
benefited by the obligation. Under Idaho law, the community was lia-
ble for the separate debts of the husband irrespective of whether they
were incurred for the benefit of the community. The Washington
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's application of Washington
law and held that neither the wife nor the community was liable.
The court restated the Baffin most-significant-relationship
approach, said it applied to suretyship contracts, and reaffirmed that
the principle did not involve merely counting contacts. The new anal-
ysis was the statement that an identification of contacts is meaningless
without consideration of the interests and public policies of potentially
concerned states and a regard as to the manner and extent of such
policies as they relate to the transaction in issue. Further, the compet-
husbands who were Washington residents. The result under Oregon law would not subject
the wives' earnings to the debt, because their wages were separate property, as that term is
defined in Oregon. ORS 108.050. The result tnder Washington law would subject the
wives' earnings to the debt, because (I) the debt was a community obligation. (2)
coOmmunit) property was reachable to satisfy it. and (3) the wives' earnings were coli tunit'
property in Walshington. Thus, a real, not false. conflict was presented in the Pacific States
Cut Stone Co. case, although the court failed to recognize it
(Emphasis in original).
14. 76 Wash. 2d 806. 459 P.2d 32 (1969). The case is briefly described in Note. 6 GoNz. L.
Ri v 152 (1970).
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ing policies must be weighed against the justified expectations of the
parties.
With this framework for analysis, the court noted that Idaho had an
interest in applying its law to protect the Idaho creditor. Washington
had an equal interest in applying its law to protect the Washington
community. Further, the property which would be executed upon in
the event of a judgment against the community was in Washington.
Thus, a true conflict existed. This was so because the two states had
conflicting public policies as to the liability of the community and each
had an interest in the application of its law because of the contacts
with the transaction.
The court resolved the problem by examining the expectations of
the parties. It concluded that the wife, had she known of the transac-
tion, would not have expected that her husband in Washington would
become vested with a new power under Idaho law to override the pro-
tections she had under Washington law. On the other hand, the Idaho
creditor knew it was dealing with Washington residents, and the court
concluded that had the creditor considered the matter, it would have
known that any execution of a judgment would be on Washington
property in Washington courts. The court held that the law of Wash-
ington had the most significant relationship to the issue of community
liability.
In Baffin, the court did little beyond listing the contacts and making
a conclusory statement as to the most significant relationship. The
opinion left uncertainty as to why the conclusion followed from the
contacts listed. In Potlatch, in addition to the notation of contacts,
there was a consideration of the public policies of the states, the inter-
ests of the states, and the expectations of the parties in a multistate
context. One can more easily understand why Washington law was
chosen. The opinion thereby represents considerable advancement in
doctrine.' 5
The court also stressed that it was deciding only that Washington
law governed on the issue of whether the community property of
Washington residents was subject to the suretyship obligation of the
husband entered into with the Idaho creditor with no benefit to the
community. As to other issues, different policies, interests, and expec-
tations might lead to a different law. This also represents doctrinal
evolution.
15. Compare the evaluation in Powers, Formalism and Nonforinalisin il Choice of Lail
Methodology, 52 WASH. L. Riv. 27, 60-62 (1976).
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One might speculate as to the result that would have been reached
had suit been brought in Idaho with that court applying a similar anal-
ysis. Would an Idaho court have applied Idaho law and allowed
recovery against the community? If so, would that mean that each
court was actually applying its own law because it was the forum or
because its law was the "better" law? We do know that the Washing-
ton court did not assert either of those factors as reasons for the appli-
cation of its own law.
Almost five years elapsed before the Washington Supreme Court
again dealt with a choice of law problem. During the interim, the
courts of appeals noted that the older orthodoxy had been replaced by
newer doctrine. Reference was made only to Baffin, however, and not
to Goble and Potlatch. The courts of appeals simply recited the most
significant contacts rule, listed contacts, and concluded that some were
more significant than others.' 6 Little guidance was provided for the
reader as to why this was so.
Two cases of consequence were decided by the supreme court in
1974. The first, Granite Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Hutton, 17
involved a guaranty contract with contacts with Washington, New
York, Arizona, and Oregon. The supreme court reversed the trial
court judgment for the defendant which was based on a determination
that Arizona law should govern. There were alternate bases for the
supreme court decision. First, although the contract called for the
application of New York law, neither party had pleaded such law.
Consequently, New York law was assumed to be the same as Wash-
ington law and, under Washington law, the defendant had no
defense. 8
Second, the court stated that even if the above procedural rule did
not exist so as to make the choice of law of the parties effective via
substitution of the law of Washington for that of New York, Washing-
ton law governed. This conclusion followed from an application of the
Baffin doctrine as embellished by Potlatch. That is, in the absence of a
16. In Warner v. Kressly, 9 Wash. App. 358, 512 P.2d 1116 (1973), an action to recover a
real estate broker's commission, the contacts in Idaho were deemed more significant than those
in British Columbia. In Burkett v. McCaw, 9 Wash. App. 917, 515 P.2d 988 (1973), as to a
question of the effect of a settlement agreement, Alabama was deemed to have the most
significant relationship.
17. 84 Wash. 2d 320, 525 P.2d 223 (1974).
18. In accord was Save-Way Drug, Inc. v. Standard Inv. Co., 5 Wash. App. 726. 490 P.2d
1342 (1971). It invoked the principle that the law of another state of the United States (in this
instance, Oregon) would be judicially noticed, if pleaded. If not pleaded, the other state's law
would be assumed to be the same as Washington law. In actuality, the court knew the content of
the Oregon law, which was stated to be similar to that in Washington.
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choice of law by the parties, the significant relationship approach
applied. The court identified the contacts of the several states, the
interests and public policies of the potentially concerned states as they
related to the transaction, and the expectations of the parties.
What, again, of the fact that the parties in the contract had called
for the application of New York law? Apparently, if that law had
been pleaded, it would have governed. This was suggested by the
court's statement that:
If the choice of this law [New York] should become ineffective for any
reason, the facts indicate that these parties would expect to proceed
under Washington law to settle any contract difficulties. All their deal-
ings occurred in Washington; they each maintained offices in Washing-
ton; and the officers and directors of respondent all lived in
Washington. 19
The court said that it was thereby clear that Washington was the
state of the applicable law because it was the state with the most signif-
icant relationship to the contract of guaranty. In summary, then, the
expressed intent of the parties apparently would have been imple-
mented had either party advised the court of the New York law.
Lacking that, an examination of the interests and public policies of
Arizona and Washington and of the expectations of the parties led to
Washington law. As in Potlatch, the reader can understand why
Washington was chosen.2"
The second, and even more noteworthy, case in 1974 was Werner v.
Werner.2" The case was complex, but for present purposes may be
viewed as a negligence action against California notaries. The plain-
tiffs contended that a notarized forgery was affixed in California to a
document affecting interests in land in Washington and that the nota-
ries were liable for the loss that thereby resulted.22
19. Hutton, 84 Wash. 2d at 326, 525 P.2d at 226-27.
20. For a different evaluation, see Powers, supra note 15, at 62.
21. 84 Wash. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974).
22. In addition to the choice of law disposition, the case was noteworthy for what was said
about personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The court first concluded that there was
personal jurisdiction over the California notaries under the Washington long arm statute because
of the "commission of a tortious act within this state" and that the exercise of such jurisdiction
would not violate due process. See WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.184(a)-(b). On the second point,
the court approved the doctrine of forum non conveniens and thereby overruled Lansverk v.
Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wash. 2d 124, 338 P.2d 747 (1959), which had rejected that
doctrine. See Trautman, Forum Non Conveniens in Washington-A Dead Issue?, 35 WASH. L.
RI-v. 88 (1960). The case was remanded to the trial court to determine in its discretion whether
to proceed in Washington or to dismiss the action because of the California witnesses, parties,
and law, the latter of which the court concluded should govern.
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Relying upon Baffin and Potlatch, the court turned to the most sig-
nificant contacts approach. Of major consequence was the fact that all
previous modern cases involved contract problems. Werner was the
first case in which the new approach was applied in a tort context.
In deciding whether to apply Washington or California law, the
court identified the contacts with each state. The court noted that the
land, the plaintiff purchasers, and the real estate agent were in Wash-
ington. On the other hand, the notaries, their employers and sureties,
and probably the forgers were in California. Most importantly,
according to the court, the notaries were public officers of the state of
California. Without further discussion, the court stated, "Thus, their
duties as notaries and potential liabilities must be defined according to
California law. ' 2
3
Nothing was said about the interests and public policies of the two
states. Only California cases and statutes were cited and discussed in
the principal text of the opinion. The court concluded that, if proved,
the failure of the notaries to take the required care in properly ascer-
taining the identity of the forgers would constitute actionable negli-
gence under California law. In a footnote, the court noted that
Washington law exacted a similar burden of care from its notaries,
thereby suggesting that the matter might have been resolved simply on
the basis of a false conflict.2 4
In one sense, Werner represented an extension of the new methodol-
ogy, namely that it applied to tort questions as well as contracts. In
another sense, Werner was a retrenchment. The court ignored the
public policy/interest analysis of Potlatch and returned to the more
simplistic and primitive analysis of Baffin.
Implicitly, however, Werner acknowledged the importance of one
aspect of the Potlatch analysis. Although the court held that Califor-
23. Werne,; 84 Wash. 2d at 368, 526 P.2d at 376-77.
24. Id. at 370, 526 P.2d at 377.
R. LiFIt.AR, L. McDoUGAI III & R. FE IX. CA\SES \NI) MVIFRI 1IS ON AMI RIC\
CoNI I icrs LAw 367 (1982) says of the case: "Because both states prescribed similar burdens of
care, the choice-of-law question seems less than crucial .. ." The authors then ask: "'What if
Washington law had prescribed a noticeably higher standard of care, such as making
Washington notaries insurers of the identity of affiants?"'
Compare J. NAFZ6-I R. tupra note 4. at 176. which speaks of Werner as a "'true conflict
Nafziger also states:
Beginning with the bold statement that -[t]he proper choice of law in this case is a rather
clearcut matter" . . . the court seemed to say that, although California and Washington
impose a similar burden of care on notaries, it is easier to impose liability in California for
the "'misconduct or neglect" . . . of a notary than in Washington.
Id. at 175. In contrast, Nafziger characterizes Werner as *'what may have even been a false
conflict.- Id. at 183.
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nia law governed as to the duties and liabilities of the notaries, it stated
in dictum that if a question of title to immovables were involved, it
would apply the law of Washington as the state of the situs. 25 Thus,
Werner reaffirmed that the newer doctrine anticipates an issue by issue
analysis.26
III. INTEREST ANALYSIS
The next major development of the new methodology came in John-
son v. Spider Staging Corporation.27 The defendants, Washington cor-.
porations, manufactured a scaffold in Washington. A resident of
Kansas was killed in that state when he fell from the scaffold. A
wrongful death action was brought on a theory that the scaffold was
defectively designed. Kansas had a $50,000 recovery limitation for
wrongful death whereas there was no damage limitation under Wash-
ington law. The Washington Supreme Court reversed a trial court
summary judgment for the defendants which held Kansas law
controlled.28
The court relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
and stated that the significant relationship rule applied to tort choice-
of-law problems as well as to contract. The Washington contacts were
as the state of incorporation and principal place of business of the
defendants; the state in which the scaffold was designed, tested, and
manufactured; the state of origination and development of the defend-
ants' advertising; the state of shipment and passage of title to the scaf-
fold; and the state which set the safety requirements for the scaffold.
The Kansas contacts were as the state in which the decedent and his
representative resided and were domiciled; the state of the decedent's
25. Traditional choice of law rules support this position. In addition, the court cited the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222 topic 2 (1971).
26. One other significant case decided in 1974 was Byrne v. Cooper, I 1 Wash. App. 549, 523
P.2d 1216 (1974). The court held that statutes or decisional law of a foreign country must be
pleaded. This was said to mean that foreign country statutes should be set forth with their
citations and decisional law should be concisely recapitulated. Judicial notice of foreign country
law was refused and proof of such law required. In the event such proof was lacking, it was said
that the claim or defense based thereon must fail. The latter conclusion was qualified by a
suggestion that the trial court was free, in its discretion, to consider any source or material to
resolve the issue of foreign law. Lastly, the issue was said to be one for the court not a jury.
Until 1983, the case was often referred to as stating the general procedure for pleading and
proving foreign country law. As of 1983, there is now a pertinent rule of court, WASH. SUPER.
CT. Civ. R. 9(k), discussed infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
27. 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976).
28. In addition, the trial court had dismissed the wrongful death action on the ground of
forum non conveniens. This determination was also reversed. Id. at 579-80, 555 P.2d at
999-1000.
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place of business; the state in which the scaffold was ordered from the
defendants' local distributor; and the state of the accident and the
decedent's death. The court concluded that the contacts were evenly
balanced.
The court then turned its attention to a consideration of the inter-
ests and public policies of the two states, an approach which the court
labeled as "state interest analysis."2 9 The court stated that a state's
interest in limiting wrongful death damages is to protect defendants
from excessive financial burdens and to eliminate speculative claims
and difficult computation issues.3" Since Kansas was not the forum
and the defendants were not from Kansas, Kansas had no interest in
the application of its law.
On the other hand, Washington's allowance of unlimited recovery
was said to be a deterrent policy. Such recovery would deter tortious
conduct and encourage manufacturers to make safe products.3 ' Since
one of the states, Washington, had an interest in the application of its
law and the other state, Kansas, had none, there was a classic false
conflict and Washington law governed.
The result was buttressed by reliance upon a factor more often of
consequence in a contract than in a tort setting, namely, the expecta-
tions of the parties. The court noted that the defendants advertised
and sold their products in all fifty states, only a few of which had
wrongful death limitations. They designed and manufactured their
product in an unlimited recovery state. In addition, they carried lia-
bility insurance in excess of the Kansas limitation. The Johnson court
concluded that the defendants could not have justifiably relied on the
Kansas limitation.3 2
29. Id. at 582, 555 P.2d at 1001. The court stated that such analysis was contemplated by
RESTATEiMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 comment d (1971), wherein it is stated:
Whether there is such another state should be determined in the light of the choice-of-law
principles stated in § 6. In large part, the answer to this question will depend upon whether
some other state has a greater interest in the determination of the particular issue than the
state where the injury occurred. The extent of the interest of each of the potentially interested
states should be determined on the basis, among other things, of the purpose sought to be
achieved by their relevant local law rules and of the particular issue involved (see § 145.
Comments c-d).
(Emphasis in original).
30. Interestingly, although Kansas was the state with the limitation, the court cited no
Kansas authority, but rather two California cases, Hurtado v. Superior Court, I I Cal. 3d 574.
580-81, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974), and Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551. 556, 432
P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
31. Interestingly, again, the court cited no Washington authority, but a California case.
Hurtado, 522 P.2d at 672, as supporting such a policy.
32. Johnson, 87 Wash. 2d at 583 n.3, 555 P.2d at 1002 n.3.
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The court might have supported its conclusion with another factor.
Although Kansas had a $50,000 limitation at the time of the accident
and death in 1971, in 1975, Kansas enacted a new statute which
imposed a $25,000 limit on nonpecuniary damages, but placed no limi-
tation on recovery for pecuniary loss.33 This change can be viewed as
a movement toward the Washington position of no limitation
whatsoever.
Although the court found a false conflict,34 the Kansas limitation
could be seen as embodying an affirmative policy as to what is ade-
quate compensation for the damage suffered, particularly when the
injured party is from Kansas.35 Kansas would then have an interest in
the application of its law just as Washington did in the application of
its law. Thus, a true conflict might exist, requiring a different ration-
ale to resolve the matter.
Also, the court might have found that the purpose behind the
unlimited recovery provision in Washington was not one of deterrence
of conduct by defendants but rather protection for plaintiffs. Because
the plaintiff was not a Washington domiciliary, Washington would
have no interest in applying its law. Kansas, we are told, had no inter-
est in limiting recovery by its resident. That would mean neither state
had an interest. Instead of a false conflict, or a true conflict, there
would be what has been labeled as the unprovided-for case, again
requiring a different rationale.36
Of the several possibilities, the result reached by the Washington
court is preferable. The court's analysis and conclusion deserve com-
mendation.37 Kansas and the plaintiff obviously had no objection to
full recovery. Broad application of the Washington law might have a
deterrent effect and allowing non-Washingtonians to benefit as much
as Washingtonians achieved equality. The Washington defendant
received fair treatment in that it needed only to look to its own law
33. The court noted this development, but seemingly placed no reliance upon it in reaching its
eventual conclusion. See id. at 578 n.1, 555 P.2d at 999 n.1.
34. That term was not used. The actual language was: "[w]hen one of the two states related
to a case has a legitimate interest in the application of its law and the other state has no such
interest, clearly the interested state's law should apply." Id. at 583, 555 P.2d at 1002. Kansas
had "no interest" and Washington had a "legitimate interest."
35. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL III & R. FELIX, supra note 24, at 366.
36. See also Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972),
wherein decedent an Ontario, Canada domiciliary was killed in Ontario in an automobile driven
by the defendant, a New York domiciliary. Ontario had a guest statute which benefited the
defendant whereas New York had no such statute thereby benefiting plaintiffs. Ontario law was
held to govern.
37. See also Sedlar, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A
Response to the 'New Critics,' 34 MERCER L. REV. 593, 624 n.150 (1983).
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and could insure in accordance with the anticipated risk. One must
remember that the court was deciding a particular issue arising in the
context of particular contacts, laws, interests, and policies. A change
in any particular might have altered the outcome. 8
While the result reached seems the most desirable one, the fact that
various policies and purposes for the law of Washington and Kansas
can be hypothesized is to be noted. One danger in an interest-analysis
approach is that counsel and/or the court will engage in speculation
about policies behind the potentially governing laws, speculation not
supported by legislative or judicial record or history. In the Johnson
case itself, no Washington or Kansas authority was cited in support of
the stated purposes for the respective state laws. One must be careful
about such speculative analysis. At the same time, it is not unusual for
a court engaged in the common law judicial process to do so.
Another explanation for the case is possible. One might view John-
son as an instance in which the Washington court applied what it
thought to be the "better law," without so stating. After all, full
recovery was the better result, was it not? Even if not the controlling
consideration, it might weigh as a factor with the court and, at the
very least, seems worthy of suggestion by counsel.39
Although there may be some question whether Johnson supports a
"better law" approach, it is clear that the case extended the new meth-
odology. State interests and policies were looked to in a tort setting.
Thus, just as Potlatch went beyond Baffin in the resolution of contract
choice-of-law problems, Johnson went beyond Werner in resolving tort
problems.
Two decisions by the courts of appeals invoked and applied the
supreme court doctrine as developed through Johnson.40 First was
38. The court relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in support of its
general approach. Arguably, the resolution of the particular issue was not supported by the
Restatement. Section 175 anticipates that usually the law of the state of injury will apply in an
action for wrongful death and Section 178 extends that application to a determination of the
measure of damages. Comment a specifically states that -[t]he law selected by application of the
rule of this Section determines, for example, whether any limitations shall be imposed upon the
amount of recovery .. " Arguably, this would call for Kansas law to be applied in Johnson
although the Restatement approach does not so mandate and is flexible enough to allow for the
result reached by the Washington court.
39. Professor Leflar, the leading proponent of a "'better law' analysis, viewed Johnson with
approval. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW & CoNrFhii'. PROBS. 10. 19
(1977).
40. A Washington Supreme Court opinion in 1977 added nothing to the developing doctrine.
See International Tracers of Am. v. Estate of Hard, 89 Wash. 2d 140, 570 P.2d 131 (1977). cert.
denied. 435 U.S. 1004 (1978). First, since no other state's law was pleaded. judicial notice of
such law was not taken. Rather, it was assumed to be the same as Washington's. Second. the
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Mentry v. Smith.4 In Mentry, both parties were residents of Washing-
ton. While driving in Oregon, the defendant struck another car,
which was driven by an Oregon resident. The plaintiff, a passenger in
the defendant's vehicle, was injured, as was the driver of the other car.
Under the Oregon host-guest statute, the defendant was not liable to
the plaintiff for ordinary negligence. Washington had no such statute.
The Washington trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint after
concluding that Oregon law governed and that there was no liability
thereunder. The court of appeals reversed.
The court stated that under Johnson a tort choice-of-law problem is
governed by the Restatement's most significant relationship rule. The
court summarized the contacts with Washington and Oregon and said
they were to be "evaluated" to determine which ones were most signif-
icant. The only contact evaluated, however, was that the other car
was driven by an Oregon resident. Since she was not a party, the con-
tact was "given very little weight." The court concluded that upon a
balance of the contacts, Washington had the most significant relation-
ship to the occurrence and the parties.
The court of appeals then stated that in conjunction with the most
significant relationship rule, Johnson "also" employed state interest
analysis. The court's meaning is not clear. If the court was still
engaged in determining the most significantly related state, its analysis
was correct. Apparently, however, the court had already decided,
based on contacts, that Washington was the most significantly related
state and then turned to a separate consideration, namely, state inter-
est analysis. If that was the court's meaning, this is a misreading or
misapplication of Johnson. Under Johnson, interest analysis is part of
the process of determining the state of most significant relationship.
In its application of interest analysis, the Mentry court selected the
Washington law. Such analysis was said to involve a consideration of
whether either state had a legitimate interest in having its law applied
on the basis of the law's purpose and whether the law's application
would advance that purpose. The court rejected a contention that a
purpose of the Oregon guest statute was to protect the assets of a neg-
ligent host for injured nonguests.42 The other asserted purpose for the
Oregon statute was to prevent collusive suits against insurance compa-
nies. That purpose would not be furthered by application of the stat-
court relied upon Baffin for the proposition that in applying the significant contacts test, great
emphasis should be put on the place of performance.
41. 18 Wash. App. 668, 571 P.2d 589 (1977).
42. Implicitly, the Washington court thereby rejected a well-known New York opinion which
had determined that one purpose underlying a Colorado host-guest statute was to protect the
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ute since the defendant's insurer was not an Oregon carrier. The court
concluded that Oregon had no interest in the application of its guest
statute.43 Without explanation, Washington was said to have a legiti-
mate interest in the application of its law.44 Although the court's
interpretation of Johnson is questionable, the result it reached is
commendable.
The second court of appeals opinion was Nelson v. Kaanapali
Properties.45 Plaintiff, a specialty subcontractor and resident of Wash-
ington, was in compliance with the Washington contractor registra-
tion act. Defendant, a joint venture between a Washington and a
Hawaiian corporation, both of which were controlled by a Washing-
ton resident, was involved in the construction of a condominium pro-
ject in Hawaii. The plaintiff subcontracted to install flooring in the
defendant's condominium units. A dispute arose regarding which
party should bear the cost of certain extra expenditures. The trial
court entered summary judgment for the defendant in the plaintiff's
breach of contract action because the plaintiff was not licensed in
Hawaii as a contractor. The court of appeals reversed after conclud-
ing that Washington, rather than Hawaii, law applied.
Relying upon Baffin, the court initially turned to the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws. It noted that under the Restatement the
place of performance was of special consequence in a personal service
contract. However, as to a particular issue, other factors might on
occasion call for the application of some other state law.4 6
As in Potlatch, the court considered the interests and public policies
of the potentially concerned states and the expectations of the parties.
The parties intended an enforceable contract with the defendant
expecting the work to be performed and the plaintiff expecting to be
paid. The interests and public policies of Hawaii and Washington in
their registration acts were said to be the same, namely, to protect the
public from irresponsible contractors. Finally, there was the policy of
priority of injured parties in other cars in the assets of a negligent defendant. See Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
The Washington court specifically approved the reasoning in another well-known decision by
the New York Court of Appeals, Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301
N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
43. It has been suggested that other purposes existed, or might have existed, for the Oregon
guest statute, such as protecting host-drivers against ungrateful guests or discouraging
hitchhiking. See J. NAFZIGER, supra note 4, at 179-80.
44. Although the court had listed Washington contacts, a discussion of the purposes of the
Washington law, and the possible advancement thereof by the law's application, would have
enhanced the usefulness of the opinion.
45. 19 Wash. App. 893, 578 P.2d 1319 (1978).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 196 comment d.
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providing a Washington resident with a forum for a dispute primarily
between Washington residents.
The decision reached was that:
The significance of the place of contracting, the domicile and resi-
dence of the parties (except one member of the Kaanapali joint venture),
the expectation interests of the parties, and the policy of Washington in
providing a forum far outweigh the significance of the place of perform-
ance and the public policy of Hawaii in applying its rule. Washington
law applies.47
In the late seventies, we have then two courts of appeals engaged in
state interest analysis, one in a tort setting relying upon Johnson and
the other in a contract setting relying upon Potlatch. In both, Wash-
ington law was held to govern. Are we to conclude that ordinarily we
may expect forum law to control?
Consider that although the Washington court in the Nelson case
determined that the underlying policy in both Hawaii and Washington
was the protection of the public from unreliable and incompetent con-
tractors, the fact remains that the Hawaii statute specifically prohib-
ited recovery for work performed by a contractor who had not
obtained a license in Hawaii. Might it not be that the plaintiff would
have been unsuccessful in a suit in Hawaii? There is some indication
that the Washington court believed so when it stated: "While Hawaii
can control access to its courts, it should not as a matter of policy be
able to control access to Washington courts, which have jurisdiction,
for resolution of a dispute primarily between Washington domiciliar-
ies."4 8 This suggests that the outcome turned on the forum selected.
Consider also that in almost every case in the decade following Baf-
fin, whether decided by the supreme court or a court of appeals,
Washington law was applied.49 This was so regardless of whether the
47. Nelson, 19 Wash. App. at 899-900, 578 P.2d at 1322. Review by the Washington
Supreme Court was dismissed.
48. Id.
49. Baflin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967)
(most significant relationship rationale; Washington law applied); Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v.
Goble, 70 Wash. 2d 907, 425 P.2d 631 (1967) (false conflict; Washington and Oregon law
applied); Potlatch No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969)
(most significant relationship and interest analysis; Washington law applied); Save-Way Drug v.
Standard Inv. Co., 5 Wash. App. 726, 490 P.2d 1342 (1971) (Washington law applied); Warner
v. Kressly, 9 Wash. App. 358, 512 P.2d 1116 (1973) (most significant contact; Idaho law rather
than British Columbia law applied); Burkett v. McCaw, 9 Wash. App. 917, 515 P.2d 988 (1973)
(most significant relationship; Alabama law applied to settlement agreement); Granite Equip.
Leasing Corp. v. Hutton, 84 Wash. 2d 320, 525 P.2d 223 (1974) (most significant relationship;
Washington law applied); Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974) (most
significant contacts; California law applied, but apparently similar to that in Washington);
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stated rationale was that of false conflict, most significant relationship,
or state interest analysis. It would be incorrect, however, to character-
ize the Washington choice of law methodology as always calling for
application of the law of the forum. This was made apparent by
Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Lapp.50
In that case, a husband incurred an obligation on a promissory note
in Colorado, the domicile at the time of the marital couple. The hus-
band defaulted on the note, and thereafter, the couple moved to Wash-
ington. Recovery was sought in Washington against the husband
individually and the marital community. Under the law of Colorado,
a noncommunity property state, the husband's earnings were subject
to the debt. Under Washington law, the husband's earnings were
community property and not subject to the husband's obligation on
the note. In a 2-1 split decision, the court of appeals affirmed a trial
court holding that the husband's earnings, and other community prop-
erty, could not be reached.5" In another split decision, 6-2, the
supreme court reversed.
The majority first stated that because the result would be different
under the law of the two states, there was a "real" conflict. To resolve
that conflict, the court invoked the most significant relationship
approach which was said to call for an analysis of interests and poli-
cies of the states and the expectations of the parties. Colorado's inter-
est was assumed to be to ensure the predictability of business relations
and to prevent the flight of debtors to other states to avoid payment of
otherwise legitimate debts. While Washington was said to have a gen-
eral interest in protecting marital communities from the entirely sepa-
rate debts of one spouse, the court assumed it had no policy interest in
maintaining a sanctuary for fleeing debtors.
With respect to the expectations of the parties, the court stated that
both spouses would have expected at the time the note was executed
that the transaction would be governed by Colorado law and could not
justifiably believe that the obligation could be avoided by the device of
moving to a state where a husband's wages would not be subject to the
debt. The creditor's expectations were said to be the same.
Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976) (state interest analysis;
Washington law applied); Mentry v. Smith, 18 Wash. App. 668, 571 P.2d 589 (1977) (interest
analysis; Washington law applied); Nelson v. Kaanapali Properties, 19 Wash. App. 893. 578 P.2d
1319 (1978) (interest analysis; Washington law applied).
50. 95 Wash. 2d 341, 622 P.2d 850 (1980).
51. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Lapp, 24 Wash. App. 795, 604 P.2d 1300 (1979). rev'd.
95 Wash. 2d 341, 622 P.2d 850 (1980).
Vol. 63:69, 1988
Choice of Law in Washington
The court concluded that the contacts, competing policies, and jus-
tifiable expectations of the parties established Colorado's interest as
more significant than Washington's. The case illustrates that while
Washington's methodology has usually resulted in the application of
its own law, the law of the forum will not always govern.
Pacific Gamble also points up the lack of certainty and predictabil-
ity which may develop from the newer methodology. Recall that the
supreme court, as had been the court of appeals, was divided. The
dissent's analysis of the interests and policies was quite different from
that of the majority.
The newer methodology includes the possibility of different states'
laws governing different issues in the same transaction. The dissent
distinguished between "contractual validity and contractual payment
source of funds." While agreeing that Colorado was the state of most
significant relationship for the purpose of determining the contract's
validity and effect, the dissent viewed the problem as one of determin-
ing the state of most significant relationship on the issue of the source
of funds available for contract damages. That was said to be
Washington.
In its examination of the policies involved, the dissent explicitly
invoked the "better law" concept. 2 The "better law" was said to be
Washington's with its "unique, progressive system of property owner-
ship that affords marital partners equal control over community
assets."53 The conclusion was that Washington, the present marital
domicile and forum, controlled because "Washington's interest in this
decision and its impact on our citizens' marital property rights is far
greater than any continuing interest by Colorado in the remedy avail-
able for breach of a transitory contract sued upon in this state."' 4
Three points should be noted in comparing the two opinions in
Pacific Gamble: First, is the importance of the characterization of the
issue; second, is the possible significance of a "better law" argument;
third, is the difficulty in predicting the court's evaluation of the com-
52. It is in the best tradition of modern conflict of laws analysis, considering the policies for
application of one state's law, rather than another's because
[t]he natural desire of every good court [is] to achieve justice by applying what it
regards as intrinsically the better rule of law . ..
R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 4, at 7 (1968).
Lapp, 95 Wash. 2d at 354,,622 P.2d at 859.
53. Lapp, 95 Wash. 2d at 355, 622 P.2d at 859.
54. Id. at 356, 622 P.2d at 860.
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peting interests, policies, and expectations. 55
How then is certainty to be provided for the parties? One possibil-
ity, at least in a consensual transaction, is a statement by the parties of
the law which they wish to have applied. Both the majority and dis-
sent in Pacific Gamble suggested this was of major consequence in the
new methodology.56
McGill v. Hill5" illustrates the point. A separation agreement
between spouses divided their property and specifically provided that
it was to be interpreted in accordance with Pennsylvania law. Follow-
ing a divorce, a dispute arose as to whether the agreement disposed of
certain employment benefits, consisting of retirement and savings
plans, which had been earned by the husband. Under Washington
law, the agreement did not include the benefits. Pennsylvania law was
to the contrary.
Applying what it characterized as "general conflict of laws princi-
ples," the court of appeals stated that an express choice of law clause
in a contract would be given effect. This meant Pennsylvania law con-
trolled, and the retirement benefits were disposed of in accordance
with the separation agreement. By effectuating the expressed intent of
the parties, the basic objectives of certainty and predictability were
achieved.
However, the expressed intent of the parties will not always control
under the new methodology. In O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc.,58 a class action was instituted on behalf of residents of Washing-
ton who maintained certain accounts with the defendant brokerage
firm to determine whether interest rates charged on those accounts
were usurious. The notes were usurious under Washington law, but
not under New York law. Each member of the class had signed an
agreement with the defendant specifying that it was to be governed by
55. This is indicated by the fact that both the majority and the dissent found support for their
conflicting conclusions in the earlier foundation case of Potlatch No. I Fed. Credit Union v.
Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969).
56. The majority said that the law of the state having the most significant relationship sith
the contract governed -[i]n the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties .... - Lapp. 95
Wash. 2d at 343, 622 P.2d at 854.
The dissent stated:
The plaintiff Pacific Gamble's principal place of business is Washington: presumably
familiar with the law of this state, it could have prevented the result of which it nov.
complains by, for example, the simple device of obtaining an agreement signed by husband
and wife at the time the debt was incurred.
Id. at 356, 622 P.2d at 860 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
57. 31 Wash. App. 542, 644 P.2d 680 (1982).
58. 90 Wash. 2d 680, 586 P.2d 830 (1978), ajf'd on rehearing, 93 Wash. 2d 51. 605 P.2d 779
(1980).
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the law of New York. In a 5-4 decision, the supreme court reversed
the trial court and held that despite the expressed choice of the parties,
Washington law controlled.
In the foundation Baffin case, much reliance was placed on the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.59 The O'Brien court noted
that whereas in Baffin the parties had not expressly designated the law
to govern their transaction, they had done so in O'Brien. Neverthe-
less, the court once again turned to the Restatement (Second) and in
particular, Section 187 as the beginning point for its analysis.60
Under Section 187, the court stated that three questions were posed
in determining whether to apply the law selected by the parties as to
59. In Baffin, the court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 332a,
332b (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960). Baffin, 70 Wash. 2d at 899-901, 425 P.2d at 627-28.
The present section most relevant to the Baffin situation is RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). Titled, "Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by
the Parties," it provides:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to
be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an
issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same
state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in
§§ 189-99 & 203.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Titled, "Law of the
State Chosen by the Parties," it provides:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by
an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the lav of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination
of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the local law
of the state of the chosen law.
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the issue of usury. First, the court concluded the higher New York
rate was contrary to a fundamental policy of Washington. Second,
Washington was deemed to have a materially greater interest than
New York in the determination of the usury issue. Third, it was
decided that if there had been no choice of law by the parties, Wash-
ington would be the state with the most significant relationship to the
transaction. The conclusion was that Washington law controlled.
O'Brien is of importance on the general matter of the effect of an
express choice of law by the parties. Under the new methodology,
such a choice is a significant factor, but will not always control. The
case is also of importance on the more particular problem of the gov-
erning law as to usury.
IV. USURY
In addition to Section 187, the O'Brien court was concerned with
another provision of the Restatement (Second). Section 203 speaks
directly about usury as follows:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury
if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which
the contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of
the rate permitted by the general usury law of the state of the otherwise
applicable law under the rule of § 188.61
The provision sets forth an alternative reference type rule which
looks favorably on the state law which will sustain the contract's valid-
ity. Nevertheless, the majority in O'Brien found a usurious violation.
The majority seemed to concede that New York, while not the most
significantly related state, did have a substantial relationship to the
transaction.62 Washington law was held to control under Section 203,
however, because the permissible interest rate of 25% in New York
was greatly in excess of the 12% permitted in Washington.63  Four
justices in dissent argued that a proper construction of Section 203
called for an examination of the actual rate charged in the contract
61. RI-STATMENT (St CONI)) O1- CONFIICIt O LAws § 203 (1971).
62. The majority stated, "While New York. as previously illustrated, is not the state with the
most significant relationship under section 188(2), it can be argued it does have a substantial
relationship to the transaction." O'Brien %,. Shearson Hayden Stone. Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 687. 586
P.2d 834 (1978).
63. The majority concluded that California, rather than Washington. was the more
significantly related state as to some members of the plaintiff class, namely, those whose
'dealings. negotiations. and payments were conducted through defendant's Los Angeles office.-
d. at 688. 586 11.2d at 834.
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and not what might have been charged under New York law.64 The
actual rate in the contract was 14%, an amount not greatly in excess
of the 12% permitted in Washington.
Upon reconsideration, the court again split 5-4.65 The majority
adhered to its original opinion with added comments. In dicta, it
stated that if the contract had stipulated a rate of 13% or 14%, the
contract would have been valid. No actual rate was stipulated; rather,
the rate of interest was open ended. Since the 25% allowed under
New York law was permissible under the contract, the rate was
greatly in excess of that permitted by Washington law and was
66
usurious.
The supreme court was again confronted with a usury problem in
Whitaker v. Spiegel, Inc.67 The defendant, a Delaware corporation
with its principal offices in Illinois, was engaged nationwide in the mail
order merchandising of retail consumer goods and solicited business in
all fifty states. The plaintiff purchasers were Washington residents.
As in O'Brien, the parties had expressed their intent as to the gov-
erning law-in this instance, Illinois. The charged interest rate of
19.8% was permissible under Illinois law, but invalid under Washing-
ton's 12% maximum rate. The supreme court held Washington law
controlled.
The rationale was terse. The court stated that while parties may
generally determine contract terms, this freedom is subject to public
policy considerations. The policy of the Washington usury statute in
providing a 12% maximum rate was to protect state residents from
oppressive and burdensome rates. To further that policy, the legisla-
ture had enacted a choice of law provision as follows:
Whenever a loan or forbearance is made outside Washington state to
a person then residing in this state the usury laws found in chapter 19.52
RCW, as now or hereafter amended, shall be applicable in all courts of
this state to the same extent such usury laws would be applicable if the
64. The dissent emphasized the following: The importance of effectuating the expectations of
the parties by sustaining the validity of the contract; the fact that the contract was not adhesive
or oppressive; the need to protect access to credit from out-of-state sources; and the insignificance
of a few percentage points difference in the states' laws. Id. at 694-96, 586 P.2d at 837-39.
65. O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 93 Wash. 2d 51, 605 P.2d 779 (1980).
WItNTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFt.tcT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1986), refers to the case as
contrary to the result reached in most cases.
66. The dissent argued that the majority's construction would "read out of section 203 any
contract providing for a variable interest rate .. .- O'Brien. 93 Wash. 2d at 55. 605 P.2d at 781
(Horowitz, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the actual rate charged, 14%. was the
critical factor in applying Section 203.
67. 95 Wash. 2d 408, 623 P.2d 1147, modified. 95 Wash. 2d 661, 637 P.2d 235, appeal
disinissed 454 U.S. 958 (1981).
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loan or forbearance was made in this state.68
The court stated:
The legislative mandate is clear: In an interstate loan transaction, the
Washington courts are not free to engage in conflict of law analysis to
determine whether or not the parties' own choice of law provision
should apply. Rather, the legislature has directed that, in an action
brought in Washington on an allegedly usurious transaction, Washing-
tbn's usury law will apply if the debtor was a resident of Washington at
the time the loan was made, even if the loan was made outside the
state.... It follows that Washington's usury law, RCW 19.52, applies
to the present transaction. [Citations omitted.]69
It appears that in view of the legislative policy, as construed in the
Whitaker case, one may ordinarily expect the Washington usury laws
to apply if the debtor was a resident of Washington at the time the
loan was made. In those instances in which the courts are free of the
legislative mandate, the conflict problem will apparently be resolved
on the basis of the Restatement (Second), particularly Sections 187,
188 and 203, as construed in the O'Brien case.7 °
V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Another area which has generated difficult conflicts problems for
the Washington courts is that of punitive damages. Two cases illus-
trate the hazards in predicting the result under the new methodology.
In Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp.,71 a Washington corporation,
which was licensed to manufacture devices used in oil drilling, was
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.034 (1985).
69. Whitaker, 95 Wash. 2d at 667-68, 637 P.2d at 235. The original opinion stated: "'Rather,
the legislature has directed that, in an action brought in Washington on an allegedly usurious
transaction, Washington's usury law will apply, even if the loan was made outside Washington to
a Washington resident." Whitaker, 623 P.2d at 1151. The scope of the original opinion was
narrowed by an amendment to read as stated in the text. See Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp.,
96 Wash. 2d 416, 423, 635 P.2d 708, 712 (1981).
70. See, for example, Golden Horse Farms v. Parcher, 29 Wash. App. 650, 629 P.2d 1353
(1981), which involved an action on promissory notes and to foreclose a mortgage on
Washington land. The notes, which had been executed in Canada by a Canadian corporation,
provided for British Columbia law to govern the interest rates. After concluding that the
Washington legislative mandate (WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.034 (1985)) was not pertinent
because the obligor was a Canadian corporation, the court of appeals turned to the O'Brien
decision and the RESTATEMENT (SEtCOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 203 (1971). The contract
was upheld under British Columbia law against the contention of usury.
For a detailed analysis of the usury problem see Davidson & Loomis. Usury: The Choice of
Law in Washington, 16 GONz. L. REV. 259 (1981).
71. 96 Wash. 2d 416, 635 P.2d 708 (1981). The case is discussed in Comment, Conflict of
Laws Punitive Damages, 17 GONZ. L. Rtsv. 923 (1982).
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sued by California residents, who were holders of patents on the
devices, for breach of the license contract and fraud in its inducement.
Numerous issues were raised on appeal, one of which was whether
California law, which allowed punitive damages, or Washington law,
which prohibited such damages, applied to the fraud claim. The court
of appeals affirmed a superior court decision which held California law
was applicable and the court of appeals was in turn affirmed by the
supreme court.72
Specific reference was made to the fact that the defendant chose to
go to California to negotiate its contract, that the fraudulent represen-
tations were made in California, and that the parties had agreed that
California law would apply.
The supreme court then stated:
Where the most significant relationships were in California and where
the conduct and acts as to the fraud and misrepresentation were accom-
plished in California that state has a specific interest to be furthered.
We hold under these circumstances that a Washington court can award
punitive damages under the law of California.73
It is unclear what California interest the supreme court had in
mind. The supreme court quoted with approval from the court of
appeals opinion, which stated: "California has an obvious interest in
the protection of its citizens against fraud, which is enhanced when the
negotiations on which the fraud claim is based occurred in California.
California has an interest in deterring fraudulent activities by corpora-
tions having a substantial business presence within its borders."'74
To which California interest was the supreme court referring, that
of protecting state citizens or that of deterring conduct? Or was it to
both?
The ambiguity is further enhanced by the court's reference to two
other cases. The court stated that Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank75
was "completely different" in that Florida had had no interest in
deterrence when the conduct and acts which might warrant punitive
72. The court of appeals decision is Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 27 Wash. App. 512,
618 P.2d 1330 (1980). The court of appeals concluded that California was the state of most
significant relationship as to the issues of recovery for fraud and the right to punitive damages.
73. Kammerer, 96 Wash. 2d at 423, 635 P.2d at 712. Unlike the court of appeals which
discussed the conflicts controversy in two parts, namely, the governing law as to the plaintiff's
claim for fraud and punitive damages, the supreme court posed the conflicts problem as a
singular issue of the governing law as to punitive damages.
74. Id. at 422, 635 P.2d at 712 (quoting Kammerer, 27 Wash. App. at 520, 618 P.2d at 1336).
75. 96 Wash. 2d 402, 635 P.2d 441, mnodified, 96 Wash. 2d 692, 649 P.2d 827 (1981). Barr
was decided the same day as Kammerer. For a discussion of Barr see infra notes 84-87 and
accompanying text.
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damages had not occurred in Florida. This suggests that the impor-
tant California interest in Kammerer was that of deterrence.
The Kammerer court also distinguished the earlier case of Whitaker
v. Spiegel, Inc.,76 in which Washington's usury law had been applied to
protect a Washington debtor. The Kammerer court said: "The dis-
tinction between Whitaker and this case is apparent: In Whitaker, the
injured party was a resident of Washington. Here the plaintiffs were at
all times residents of California."77 This suggests that the California
interest of consequence in Kammerer was not that of deterrence of the
Washington defendant but rather protection of the California plaintiff.
While it is unclear exactly why California law was applied in Kam-
merer, it is very clear that the presence of a strong forum public policy
will not necessarily lead to Washington law under the new methodol-
ogy. This is made apparent, not by anything said directly by the
majority, but rather by the vigorous dissent.
The majority simply noted that under Washington law punitive
damages were not allowed unless expressly authorized by the legisla-
ture. Nothing was said about the purposes or policies behind that
law.78 In striking contrast, there was a lengthy dissent by Justice
Stafford.79
The dissent is a scholarly review and presentation of the Washing-
ton position on punitive damages. The problem was whether that
position, and the policy it represents, should control in a conflicts
context.
76. 95 Wash. 2d 408, 623 P.2d 1147, mnodified, 95 Wash. 2d 661, 637 P.2d 235, appeal
dismissed. 454 U.S. 958 (1981).
77. Kammerer 96 Wash. 2d at 423, 635 P.2d at 712-13.
78. The only reference by the 7-2 majority to any Washington interest or policy was the
following quotation from the court of appeals opinion:
Washington has no interest in protecting persons who commit fraud. Western Gear
asserts that differences in Washington and California law governing fraud suggest that
Washington has a policy of greater caution in allowing judgments for fraud. Because we do
not find any difference, material to this case, in the laws of the two states, we do not find ally
interest served by application of Washington law. Because Washington has no interests
superior to or inconsistent with the interests of California in this controversy, application of
the Restatement rule dictates that California law govern the Kammerers' claim for fraud.
Id. at 422, 635 P.2d at 712 (quoting Kammerer. 27 Wash. App. at 520-21. 618 P.2d at 1336) It
should be noted that the quoted comments are not directed towards punitive damages
The court of appeals did briefly discuss Washington's public policy concerning punitie dam-
ages. Kammrerer, 27 Wash. App. at 521-23, 618 P.2d at 1337. This discussion was not men-
tioned by the supreme court majority in Kammerer Interestingly, in a companion case. Barr 96
Wash. 2d 402. 635 P.2d 441 (1981), modified. 96 Wash. 2d 692. 649 P.2d 827 (1981). the
supreme court did take note of the court of appeals opinion in Kammerer. In Barr. the supreme
court said that contrary to the court of appeals view in Kamnmerer punitive damages are con-
trary to the public policy of Washington. Barr. 96 Wash. 2d at 699, 635 P.2d at 444.
79. Justice Stafford was joined in dissent by Chief Justice Brachtenbach.
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Justice Stafford's answer was as follows: "I agree with the abstract
concept that under the 'most significant contacts' theory California
law should govern this transaction. Nevertheless, the normal 'choice
of law' result must be overridden by strong public policy in this, the
forum state."8
Several questions are suggested by this response. Instead of an
approach which determines the state of most significant contact and
then looks to forum public policy, would it be better to incorporate the
factor of the forum's policy as part of the significant contact analy-
sis?81 Would it make any difference in result?82 Should a strong
forum public policy always prevail over all other contacts and
policies?83
Unfortunately, the majority opinion was silent on such matters.
The result, however, was clear. Despite an unquestionably strong
public policy in the Washington forum, that internal policy was not
implemented.
Another case decided the same day as Kammerer was Barr v.
Interbay Citizens Bank 84 In a complex factual setting, a Washington
resident sued a Florida defendant for improper repossession of an
automobile in Washington. Florida law permitted punitive damages
while such damages were prohibited in Washington. In contrast to
Kammerer, wherein California law was applied to allow punitive dam-
ages, the supreme court in Barr denied such damages by applying
Washington law.
80. Kainmnerer, 96 Wash. 2d at 424-25, 635 P.2d at 713 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
81. Justice Stafford alluded to this in a footnote as follows:
Few recent cases have employed a "public policy" analysis to conflict of law decisions.
This is not because public policy has become any less significant, however. Rather, many
states (such as California) use "interest analysis" to determine choice of law, or use a "better
law" analysis. Both methods are based almost entirely upon policy considerations, however.
Id. at 427 n.l, 635 P.2d at 714 n.1 (Stafford, J., dissenting). Compare James v. Powell, 19
N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1967), wherein New York, on the issue of puni-
tive damages, looked to the law of the jurisdiction with the strongest interest in the resolution of
that issue.
82. Conceivably, treating the forum's public policy separately might more often lead to its
implementation than treating it as part of an overall significant contact or interest analysis
problem. Perhaps Justice Stafford had this in mind, when, in criticizing the majority's result, he
asked, "[W]ill it be necessary for us, in each case, to employ a different standard of appellate
review depending upon which state's law is applied?" See Kammerer, 96 Wash. 2d at 437, 635
P.2d at 720 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
83. Justice Stafford concluded it would not be unfair to the plaintiffs to be denied punitive
damages even though the "otherwise applicable" California law allowed them. The plaintiffs
could have brought suit in California. Since they chose Washington as the forum, Justice
Stafford felt they should be bound by Washington policy. See id. at 438, 635 P.2d at 720
(Stafford, J., dissenting).
84. 96 Wash. 2d 402, 635 P.2d 441, mnodified, 96 Wash. 2d 692, 635 P.2d 441 (1981).
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The court first asked which state had the most significant relation-
ship on the issue of punitive damages. The court determined that the
purpose for punitive damages in Florida was that of deterrence and
that such an interest would not be furthered when the conduct and
acts occurred in Washington. 5 The court then noted the long history
in Washington against punitive damages and said such damages were
contrary to public policy. The conclusion was: "In the context of this
case, the argument that compensatory damages fully compensate the
plaintiff for all injuries to person or property, tangible or intangible, is
particularly in point .... We hold in this case the state of most signifi-
cant relationships on the imposition of punitive damages is Washing-
ton."86 What did the court mean by "In the context of this case"?
Was the critical factor that the defendant's conduct and acts in Barr
were not in Florida, whereas in Kammerer they were in California?
That was apparently the basis for the statement in Kammerer that
Barr was "completely different."87 Or was the critical factor that the
plaintiff was a resident of Washington in Barr just as the plaintiff was
a resident of California in Kammerer? After all, in Barr, the court
stated that the fact that compensatory damages fully compensated the
plaintiff was particularly in point.
What then would be the result if the plaintiff were a resident of one
state and the defendant's conduct occurred in another? Which law
would determine punitive damages? The court in Barr noted that
every tort rule is designed to some extent to both deter and compen-
sate. Apparently, in Barr, and perhaps in Kammerer, the court felt
that the factual situation was such that both purposes coincided. But
what if that were not the case, as when the plaintiff is a resident of
Washington and the defendant acts in state X, which allows punitive
damages, or when the plaintiff is a resident of state X and the defend-
ant acts in Washington? And what of the importance of the purpose
in each state of its particular rule on punitive damages? Such
problems remain to be answered.
VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
An area which has been greatly affected by recent developments is
that of statutes of limitations. The principal change has occurred
because of legislation, but a federal case is worthy of notice.
85. There were contacts with Nevada, but since that law was not pleaded or proved, it was
presumed to be the same as that in Washington.
86. Barr, 96 Wash. 2d at 700, 635 P.2d at 444-45.
87. Kammerer, 96 Wash. 2d at 422, 635 P.2d at 712.
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In Tomlin v. Boeing Co.,88 a federal court with diversity jurisdiction
was confronted with the problem of applying Washington's new meth-
odology.89 Two servicemen were killed in a helicopter crash in Viet-
nam because of a defect in a rotor blade. The helicoptor and blade had
been built by Vetrol, a Pennsylvania based division of the defendant
Boeing Company. Survivors of the servicemen lived in Alabama and
Florida at the time of the accident. Wrongful death actions were insti-
tuted in a federal district court in Washington one day before the expi-
ration of Washington's three-year statute of limitations. The
limitation period had elapsed in the other three states; Alabama and
Florida had two-year limitations and Pennsylvania had a one-year lim-
itation. The case thus turned on which state's statute governed. 90 The
federal court of appeals invoked Washington's new conflicts methodol-
ogy, concluded Washington's three-year period applied and held the
action was not time-barred.
After noting the traditional conflicts approach of distinguishing
statutes of limitations as procedural or substantive, the federal court
predicted Washington would extend its newer choice-of-law analysis
to the area of statutes of limitations. Principal reliance for this predic-
tion was placed upon the Washington decision in Johnson v. Spider
Staging Corp., 9' in which the newer approach had been used to resolve
a conflict as to the amount of damages recoverable under wrongful
death statutes.
Application of the Johnson-type analysis involved a consideration
by the court of the several states' interests. The purpose of statutes of
limitations was said to be to protect courts, by conserving judicial
resources, and defendants, by providing repose. As to the former, the
court concluded that the judicial resources of the other states would be
unaffected by a suit in Washington, which had chosen to make its
courts available for three years.
With respect to defendants, Alabama and Florida had no interest in
protecting a Washington defendant, particularly when their own resi-
dents were the plaintiffs. It was true that Pennsylvania had an interest
in protecting Boeing's subdivision, Vetrol, which had manufactured
88. 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981).
89. The case was filed in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington
based on diversity. The federal court was obliged to apply Washington law, including its
conflicts law. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
90. None of the parties contended that the law of Vietnam should be applied and the court
did not consider that possibility.
91. 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976). See the discussion supra in conjunction with notes
27-39.
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the rotor blade in Pennsylvania. The court noted, however, that the
actual defendant was Boeing, which had its principal place of business
in Washington. Washington's longer three-year period of limitations
was seen as expressing a policy of deterring the conduct of tort defend-
ants. The court concluded that Washington would be interested in
deterring the wrongful conduct of its most prominent corporate busi-
ness regardless where the actual manufacturing took place. Conse-
quently, the Washington three-year period was applied.
The prediction that a Washington court would invoke its new meth-
odology in a conflicts-statute of limitations context seems correct. The
determination that a purpose of the Washington statute of limitations
was to deter certain conduct seems questionable. The fact that the
federal court cited no authority of any kind for this proposition is
striking. The court sought support from the Johnson case in conclud-
ing that just as a provision for full compensation in a wrongful death
statute expressed a deterrent policy so did a provision for a longer
period of limitation. The analogy is strained.
Equally questionable is the federal court's reliance on another
Washington case. The federal court quoted the Washington court as
having stated that where it is "questionable which of ... two statutes
[of limitation] appl[y], the rule is that the statute applying the longest
period is generally used."92 The quoted Washington case did not
involve a conflict of laws question. The problem therein was whether
to apply a shorter Washington statute relating to actions based on oral
contracts or a longer Washington statute relating to actions for recov-
ery of an interest in real property. It does not necessarily follow that
because Washington applied the longer of two Washington statutes
that it would apply a longer Washington statute rather than a shorter
Pennsylvania statute. At the very least, further analysis was required.
Whether Tomlin properly invoked and applied the new Washington
conflicts doctrine remains to be answered. Related to that question is
a subsequent development of great importance in 1983.
The traditional approach has been to treat statutes of limitations as
procedural in nature and thereby to apply the statute of the forum.
This has led to forum shopping in instances in which the limitation
period at the forum was longer than that in other contact states. In
response, different states have created different exceptions whereby
some statutes have been regarded as substantive in nature.
92. Tomlin, 650 F.2d at 1072 (quoting Shew v. Coon Bay Loafers. Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 40. 51.
455 P.2d 359, 366 (1969)).
Vol. 63:69, 1988
Choice of Law in Washington
To remedy the problems generated by the traditional procedure
characterization and its often confusing exceptions, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the
Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act in 1982. 9 3 In 1983, Wash-
ington became the first state to enact the uniform act.94 To date, there
are no Washington appellate decisions applying or interpreting the act.
Consequently, the expected impact and application of the Washington
statutes must be determined from the comments of the commissioners
about the uniform act.
Following a definitions section,95 the act provides:
(1) Except as provided by RCW 4.18.040, if a claim is substantively
based:
(a) Upon the law of one other state, the limitation period of that
state applies; or
(b) Upon the law of more than one state, the limitation period of
one of those states, chosen by the law of conflict of laws of this state,
applies.
(2) The limitation period of this state applies to all other claims. 96
Unlike the traditional approach, the statute treats limitation periods
as substantive and thereby governed by the limitations law of a state
whose law governs other substantive issues. This will be true whether
the limitation period of the substantively governing law is longer or
shorter than that of Washington. As to which state's law will govern,
that will be determined in accordance with Washington's new conflicts
methodology. 97
The Act then provides:
93. 12 U.L.A. 46 (Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the background of the uniform act and
the history of its creation, see Leflar, The New Conflicts-Limitations Act, 35 MERCER L. REV.
461 (1984).
94. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 4.18 (1985). It is discussed in a legislative note, Note,
Legislative Developments in Conflict of Laws: Washington Adopts the Uniform Conflict of Laws-
Limitations Act. H.B. 925 (1983), 20 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (1984/85).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.18.010 (1985) provides:
As used in this chapter:
(I) "Claim" means a right of action that may be asserted in a civil action or proceeding
and includes a right of action created by statute.
(2) "State" means a state, commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign country, or a
political subdivision of any of them.
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.18.020 (1985).
97. In Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981), the federal court applied
Washington's new choice-of-law analysis to the statute of limitations issue without consideration
of the controlling law on other issues.
In contrast, the uniform act appears to direct a Washington court to determine which state's
law governs a claim and then to apply that state's statute of limitations. See WASH. REV. CODE
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If the statute of limitations of another state applies to the assertion of
a claim in this state, the other state's relevant statutes and other rules of
law governing tolling and accrual apply in computing the limitation
period, but its statutes and other rules of law governing conflict of laws
do not apply.9"
Under this section, tolling and accrual provisions are treated as
parts of the limitations law of the state whose law is deemed applica-
ble. It should be noted, however, that the limitation period of that
state does not include its rules as to when an action is commenced.
That will be determined by Washington law, as the forum. The last
clause in the section directs the Washington court not to apply the
other state's conflict of laws rules and thereby avoids renvoi problems.
The final provision requiring comment states:
If the court determines that the limitation period of another state
applicable under RCW 4.18.020 and 4.18.030 is substantially different
from the limitation period of this state and has not afforded a fair oppor-
tunity to sue upon, or imposes an unfair burden in defending against, the
claim, the limitation period of this state applies.99
The point to be emphasized is that while the section provides an
escape clause to avoid injustices, it should be invoked only in excep-
tional circumstances. To do otherwise will defeat the purpose of the
act. In the ordinary case, the limitations period of a state whose law
governs other substantive issues, as determined by Washington's new
methodology, is to be applied.
VII. PLEADING FOREIGN LAW
In addition to the enactment of the uniform limitations act, a sec-
ond important development occurred in 1983. In that year Civil Rule
9(k),'o relating to the pleading of foreign law, was adopted, and Civil
Rule 44.1,01 relating to the determination of foreign law, was
amended.'0 2 As a result, a number of problems that existed were
§ 4.18.020(l)(a) (1985). Thereby, there will be no independent determination on the statute of
limitations issue.
There is a qualification, however. If a claim is substantively based upon the law of more than
one state, apparently a Washington court will independently apply its new methodology to the
statute of limitations issue to select among the several states. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.18.020(l)(b) (1985).
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.18.030 (1985).
99. WASH. R-V. CODE § 4.18.040 (1985).
100. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(k).
101. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 44.1.
102. For a discussion of the situation before the 1983 amendments see Trautman, Pleading
Principles and Problems in Washington. 56 WASH. L. REV. 687, 698-701 (1981).
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clarified.' 3o
In the present context, the term "foreign law" is used to include
both the law of states, territories and other jurisdictions of the United
States and the law of foreign countries. It is necessary, however, to
distinguish between the law of other United States jurisdictions, which
usually means the law of sister states, and the law of foreign countries.
There are now three methods by which a party may advise the
adversary and the court of one's intent to rely upon the law of a sister
state. They are: One, by setting forth in a pleading facts which show
that the law of a sister state may be applicable; two, by stating in a
pleading that sister-state law may be relied upon; or three, by serving
other reasonable notice that the law of a sister state may be relied
upon.'4
Cases prior to 1983 established that a failure to properly plead and
prove the law of a sister state resulted in a presumption that that
state's law was the same as the law of Washington.10 5 Presumably,
that principle will continue to apply in the event of a failure to comply
with the requirements of the new rule. If the rule is complied with and
proper notice is given, the law of a sister state may be judicially
noticed in accordance with established procedures. 106
The rules are different if a foreign country is involved. A party who
intends to rely upon the law of a foreign country must give notice in a
pleading of the country whose law it is contended may be applicable.
Certain matters need not be pleaded, but are subject to the discovery
process. These matters are the party's contentions as to which issues
of law are governed by the foreign country law, the substance of such
law, the expected effect of such foreign law on the legal issues and on
103. For an excellent discussion of the meaning and impact of the amendments to the rules
see Simburg, Swisher & Brown, Pleading and Proving Foreign Law-The New Rules, 37 WASH.
ST. BAR NEWS 61 (Sept. 1983). The authors characterize the result as one of "sweeping changes
which provide a more comprehensive approach to pleading and proof of foreign law than any
other in the country." Id. at 61.
104. Erickson v. Sentry Life Ins. Co., 43 Wash. App. 651, 655, 719 P.2d 160 (1986) (quoting
3A L. ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 5121 (Supp. 1984)).
105. Examples since the adoption of the new methodology include Barr v. Interbay Citizens
Bank, 96 Wash. 2d 402, 635 P.2d 441, nodified, 96 Wash. 2d 692, 635 P.2d 441 (1981);
International Tracers of Am. v. Estate of Hard, 89 Wash. 2d 140, 570 P.2d 131 (1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1004 (1978); In re Estate of Nelson, 85 Wash. 2d 602, 537 P.2d 765 (1975);
Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Hutton, 84 Wash. 2d 320, 525 P.2d 223 (1974); Save-Way Drug,
Inc. v. Standard Inv. Co., 5 Wash. App. 726, 490 P.2d 1342 (1971).
106. WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 44.1(b) provides: "The law of a state, territory, or other
jurisdiction of the United States shall be determined as provided in RCW 5.24." WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 5.24.010-.070 (1985) sets forth the procedures whereby judicial notice may be taken of
a sister state's law.
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the outcome of the case, and the specific statutes and decisions upon
which the party intends to rely.17
If none of the parties requests in the pleadings that foreign country
law be applied, the court is to apply the law of Washington, unless
such application would result in manifest injustice.' °8 If there is
proper pleading, the court, in determining the foreign country law,
may consider any relevant written material or other source, including
testimony, having due regard for their trustworthiness, whether or not
submitted by a party and whether or not admissible under the usual
evidence rules.'0 9 Unlike with a sister state, there is no provision for
judicial notice of foreign country law." 0
VIII. CONCLUSION
In several recent cases, the courts of appeals have applied the new
methodology. The conflicts issues have arisen in such diverse contexts
as determining the validity of a foreign country marital agreement," '
the effect of a nunc pro tunc decree on the validity of a subsequent
marriage, 112 the status of paternity for property distribution pur-
poses, 113 and the coverage under an automobile insurance contract.'' 4
Of principal concern in each instance were the contacts of the states,
the interests and policies of the states, and the expectations of the
parties.
Of greatest consequence, however, in illustrating the present status
of choice-of-law analysis in Washington, is a supreme court opinion,
Southwell v. Widing Transportation, Inc. "' Plaintiffs instituted a
wrongful death action for the death of their son, a resident of British
107. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(k)(2).
108. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(k)(4).
109. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 44.1(c).
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.24.050 (1985) provides: "The law of any jurisdiction other than
a state, territory or other jurisdiction of the United States shall be an issue for the court, but shall
not be subject to the foregoing provisions concerning judicial notice."
11. Untersteiner v. Untersteiner, 32 Wash. App. 859, 650 P.2d 256 (1982) (Austrian law
held to govern the validity and effect of an agreement concerning alimony as not contrary to
Washington public policy).
112. In re Estate of Shippy, 37 Wash. App. 164, 678 P.2d 848 (1984) (Washington, situs of
property and domicile of parties at time of death of one spouse, determined validity of marnage,
rather than Alaska, place of marriage).
113. In re Estate of Cook, 40 Wash. App. 326, 698 P.2d 1076 (1985) (Washington, situs of
property and domicile of child at time of death, governed rather than Ohio, place of birth).
114. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 26, 701 P.2d
806 (1985) (validity of a household exclusion clause determined by Idaho, domicile of insured
and place of issuance of policy, rather than Washington, place of accident and domicile of
driver).
115. 101 Wash. 2d 200, 676 P.2d 477 (1984).
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Columbia, in a truck-motorcycle accident in British Columbia. The
defendants were the owner of the truck, an Oregon corporation which
did business in Washington, and the driver, a Washington resident.
The truck had been dispatched from Washington to British Columbia
to pick up a load of steel castings from a Canadian corporation. While
the truck was en route back to Washington, a casting fell from the
truck, killing the decedent. British Columbia law did not allow for
recovery for lost and future earnings while Washington law did. A
court of appeals ruling on a pretrial motion that Washington law con-
trolled was reversed by the supreme court on the ground there was not
an adequate factual record to decide the choice-of-law issue.
Southwell restated several important points about Washington's
present conflicts methodology. First, the approach outlined in John-
son v. Spider Staging Corp. II6 controls. This was said to involve a two-
step analysis, that of evaluating contacts and that of evaluating inter-
ests and public policies." 7 Second, the evaluation is to be in the con-
text of the particular issue, which in this instance was the amount of
damages.' " 8 Third, the analysis is not one of simply applying the law
of the forum.119
Several questions are suggested by Southwell. There is the prag-
matic consideration for counsel of how to produce an adequate factual
record in order that a choice-of-law issue can be resolved. Is the
answer that this is no different than the need for a proper factual rec-
ord to resolve any legal question? But what of the fact that the law-
yers and the lower courts apparently felt that there was an adequate
record? Does this suggest some confusion as to what the new method-
ology means?' 2 ' Or is this just another instance in which courts legiti-
116. 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976).
117. The Johnson approach might be viewed as a one-step analysis. How can one evaluate a
contact without considering the interests and public policies of the states? The Southwell court
states its first step as "an evaluation of the contacts with each interested jurisdiction." Southwell,
101 Wash. 2d at 204, 555 P.2d at 480. Similarly, how can one evaluate interests and public
policies without considering the contacts with a particular state? The court states its second step
as "an evaluation of the interests and public policies of potentially concerned jurisdictions." Id.
Is the.analysis really one step in determining the most significantly related state in view of the
contacts, interests and public policies? Or is all of this merely a matter of semantics?
118. This contrasts with a blanket rule such as applying the law of the place of a tort or the
place of the making of a contract.
119. The court stated: "[i]f we were to decide this case on this record, and find Washington
law should govern the issue of damages, we would essentially be adopting a rule of lexi fori."
Southwell, 101 Wash. 2d at 207, 676 P.2d at 481.
120. R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL III & R. FELIX, supra note 24, at 22 (Supp. 1985).
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mately differ as to the adequacy of a particular record? 2 '
Critical to the new methodology is an analysis of interests. Cannot
any lawyer worth his or her salt create some interests to justify the
application of the desired law of one of the states with contacts? And
cannot any lawyer explain away the interests asserted by the adver-
sary? Is this a major defect in the methodology? Or is this like any
issue to be resolved by a court following adversarial presentation of
competing interests and policies, whether meritorious or not?
The Southwell majority stated that "[w]hile Johnson makes the ana-
lytical framework clear, the ultimate outcome, in any given case,
depends upon the underlying facts of that case."' 2 2 Has choice of law
in Washington become an ad hoc approach without predictability for
parties, counsel, or the lower courts? Or is the court simply function-
ing as one expects in having stated the essential guidelines and factors
to be considered in the context of the individual case?
It is this writer's conclusion that the supreme court is to be com-
mended for its choice-of-law decisions over the past twenty years. The
court has established an understandable methodology for the resolu-
tion of conflicts issues. Certainly, the answer to each possible choice-
of-law problem is not clear. The framework to approach each prob-
lem has been set, however. That is as much as one can expect. The
answer to each problem may depend on the individual facts. That
likewise is to be expected. Such is the evolutionary process of choice
of law, and, of the common law.
121. The dissent in Southwell. a 7-2 decision, believed that the record was adequate. that the
case was indistinguishable from Johntson and that therefore Washington law governed.
Sohihwell. 101 Wash. 2d at 209-12, 676 P.2d at 483-84 (Dore, J.. dissenting).
122. Id. at 204, 676 P.2d at 480.
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